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Drawing upon developments in cultural and social memory studies and europeanization 
theory, this article examines the europeanization of Holocaust memory understood as 
the process of construction, institutionalization, and diffusion of beliefs regarding the 
Holocaust and norms and rules regarding Holocaust remembrance and education at a 
transnational, european level since the 1990s and their incorporation in the countries 
of post-communist eastern europe, which is also the area where the Holocaust largely 
took place. The article identifies the transnational agents of the europeanization of 
Holocaust memory—the european Union’s parliament, the International Holocaust 
Remembrance alliance, the Council of europe, the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in europe, and its Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 
as well as the United Nations. It analyzes chronologically the key Holocaust-related 
activities and documents of these agents, highlighting east european countries’ varied 
and changing position towards them. It examines synchronically the outcome of the 
europeanization of Holocaust memory by these transnational agents—a european 
memory of the Holocaust—identifying its key components, discussing the main 
aspects, and illustrating the impact of this process and outcome upon the memory of 
the Holocaust in the east european countries. The article argues that the europeanization 
of Holocaust memory has significantly contributed to the development of Holocaust 
memory in eastern europe, although other agents and processes were also involved.
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Introduction
More than seventy years since it happened, the Holocaust—“the state-sponsored 
persecution and murder of european Jews by Nazi germany and its collaborators 
between 1933 and 1945”1—has undergone a remarkable development in collective 
memory.2 Shortly after the Second World War, it was hardly distinguishable among 
Nazi crimes. In the late 1940s and 1950s, it was shrouded in silence, or even faded 
into oblivion. Since the 1960s, however, it has gradually become an ever more 
important object of national memory in Israel, the USa, West germany, and other 
(West) european countries. Meanwhile, in eastern europe, where the persecution 
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and murder of Jews had largely taken place, there was little, hardly any, or no public 
memory of the Holocaust, as the countries of the region were under communist rule 
between the late 1940s and 1989–1991.3 Isolated by the “Iron Curtain,” the nations 
of eastern europe were also barely confronted with the Holocaust memory that was 
developing in the West—Western europe, North america, and Israel. The Western 
memory of the Holocaust did not arrive in eastern europe until the nations of the 
region began liberating themselves from communism and opened themselves to the 
world.4 around that time, new developments in Holocaust memory occurred. Since 
the early 1990s, the Holocaust, an important object of national memories in the 
West, has also become an object of transnational global/cosmopolitan memory.5 In 
(Western) europe, a transnational european memory has developed making the 
Holocaust a cornerstone of the new european identity.6
The process of developing a transnational european memory of the Holocaust can 
be best rendered as the Europeanization of Holocaust memory.7 In general terms, as 
“europeanization” commonly refers to the growth of a european polity and identity 
over and above national polities and identities on the continent in the course of devel-
opment of the european Union (eU), the “europeanization of Holocaust memory” 
may also be understood in this context as the process of constructing a european 
memory of the persecution and murder of Jews during the Second World War over 
and above the national memories of that event.8 This article, however, will employ a 
different and more specific concept of europeanization. Drawing upon a prominent 
definition proposed by the political scientist Claudio M. Radaelli,9 the europeanization 
of Holocaust memory will be understood here as the process of construction, institu-
tionalization, and diffusion of beliefs regarding the Holocaust as well as formal and 
informal norms and rules regarding Holocaust remembrance and education that have 
been first defined and consolidated at a european level and then incorporated into the 
practices of european countries. The theories of europeanization indicate the eU, 
with its institutions, as the agent of that process. The article will show that the 
european Parliament (eP) was the eU institution that launched the europeanization 
of Holocaust memory and was its first transnational agent,10 which contributed to the 
development and, at the same time, europeanization of Holocaust memory in eastern 
europe. But, as will be shown, the europeanization of Holocaust memory was also 
contributed to by other transnational agents—international organizations active in 
europe and consisting mostly or solely of european states: mainly by the International 
Holocaust Remembrance alliance (IHRa), formerly called the Task Force for 
International Cooperation on Holocaust education, Remembrance, and Research 
(ITF), as well as by the Council of europe, the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in europe (OSCe), and its Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights (ODIHR). The involvement of these agents meant that the 
europeanization of Holocaust memory became a process transcending the eU and 
covering eastern europe as well. even the United Nations (UN), which, as will be 
shown, engaged in the promotion of Holocaust memory worldwide, may also be 
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considered a transnational agent contributing to the europeanization of this memory, 
particularly in eastern europe.
The europeanization of Holocaust memory began in Western europe shortly after 
the countries of eastern europe had liberated themselves from communism and 
while they were (re-) establishing closer links with Western states and seeking mem-
bership in Western organizations—the Council of europe, the eU, and the North 
atlantic Treaty Organization (NaTO). It unfolded as most of the east european 
countries were preparing for entry into these organizations, and continued after many 
of these countries had become members of them. In this context, the europeanization 
of Holocaust memory posed a double challenge to the post-communist nations of 
eastern europe—to develop their own Holocaust memories and to join in the 
european (and global/cosmopolitan) memory of the Holocaust.11 at the same time, 
the europeanization of Holocaust memory by the eU, the ITF/IHRa, and the Council 
of europe—the organizations that most of the east european states joined or aimed 
to join—has been a factor in the development and europeanization of Holocaust 
memory in eastern europe. Hence, the objective of this article will be to examine the 
nature and scope of the europeanization of Holocaust memory by various transna-
tional agents and of the impact of this process upon the memory of the Holocaust in 
eastern europe since 1989.12 In order to attain this objective, the article will take two 
steps. First, it will diachronically analyze the process of europeanization of Holocaust 
memory, focusing on construction, institutionalization, and diffusion of this memory 
by the transnational agents. Conducting this analysis, the article will also highlight 
the varied and changing position of east european countries vis-à-vis those agents 
during the various stages of the process in order to determine since when and with 
what strength the agents have been able to impact Holocaust memory in eastern 
europe. Second, the article will synchronically examine the outcome of the pro-
cess—a european memory of the Holocaust—identifying its main components. It 
will discuss the key aspects of this memory and illustrate the impact of this process 
and outcome upon the memory of the Holocaust in the east european countries.
“eastern europe” is understood in this article as the part of europe where the com-
munists ruled from after the Second World War until 1989–1991. at present, the 
region defined in this way comprises twenty states: (1) six former satellites of the 
Soviet Union: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and 
Slovakia; (2) six former Soviet republics: Belarus, estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Moldova, and Ukraine; (3) seven successor states of communist Yugoslavia: Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, (the former Yugoslav Republic of) Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia; and (4) albania.13 ever since the demise of com-
munism, the countries of the region have undergone democratization, built market 
economies, developed pluralist societies and cultures, and integrated into the eU and 
other Western organizations, albeit at different speeds and to varying degrees. Nearly 
all (with the exception of Belarus) have aspired to enter into association with the eU 
and/or to become eU member states, most of them successfully, and have thus 
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undergone or continue to undergo “europeanization through conditionality,” that is, 
adopting eU law and fulfilling formal membership criteria.14 Yet eastern europe is 
not only defined by communism, transformation, and europeanization. What is 
important for the topic of this article is that eastern europe is also defined by the 
Holocaust. It was in this region, annexed to, occupied by, or allied with Nazi germany 
in 1939–1945, that the ghettos established to isolate Jews were located, that random 
shootings and mass executions of Jews took place, and that most concentration camps 
and all death camps where Jews were murdered were operated. It was east european 
Jews that constituted 90 percent of the nearly 6 million victims of the Holocaust.15 It 
was eastern europe that West european Jews were deported to and murdered in. It 
was among (non-Jewish) east europeans—witnesses, bystanders, collaborators, 
accomplices, or even perpetrators, but also rescuers—that Nazi germany committed 
the crimes of the Holocaust. It was in what Timothy Snyder called the “bloodlands”16 
of eastern europe—where also millions of non-Jews fell victim to the Second World 
War, Nazism, and Stalinism—that the Holocaust took place. all these are the charac-
teristics of the “east europeanness” of the Holocaust that has made and still makes 
Holocaust memory in eastern europe highly difficult to develop.
“Memory” is the key concept in this article. It is understood here as in the field of 
cultural and social memory studies.17 The notion derives from Maurice Halbwachs’s 
classic concept of “collective memory” that refers to beliefs, feelings, moral judg-
ments, and knowledge about the past distributed throughout society, and his study 
of commemorative symbols, rituals, and representations.18 analyzing the 
europeanization of Holocaust memory, the article draws upon Jeffrey K. Olick’s 
developments of Halbwachs’s classic conceptions—the historical sociology of mne-
monic practices and products.19 Thus the analysis concerns remembrance understood 
as institutionalized, official, and public collective memory. It deals with such prac-
tices as adopting Holocaust memory documents, conducting Holocaust commemora-
tions, and deciding on and implementing Holocaust education. It discusses such 
Holocaust memory products as the eP’s resolutions and declarations, monuments 
and memorial plaques, museums and exhibitions, school curricula, and textbooks. 
These processes and products of Holocaust memory are subjected to institutional and 
content analysis, respectively.
So far, few authors have addressed the issues that will be dealt with in this article. 
The existing publications may be divided into four categories. The first comprises 
the seminal works of Daniel Levy and Nathan Sznaider20 as well as Tony Judt21 on 
Holocaust memory. Levy and Sznaider remarked that “[national] memories of the 
Holocaust contribute[d] to the creation of a common european cultural memory.”22 
They wrote about the role of the Stockholm Forum—the founding meeting of the 
IHRa—for “the institutionalization of an emerging european cosmopolitan 
memory.”23 They failed, however, to recognize the role of the eU and its institutions, 
primarily the eP, in that process. They noticed that “the Holocaust ha[d] been 
inscribed in the historical awareness of West european nations (and increasingly also 
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in eastern europe).”24 The analysis of developments in eastern europe was, alas, 
beyond the ambit of their project. Judt stressed “the centrality of the Holocaust in 
Western european identity and memory” and wrote about “Holocaust recognition” in 
eastern europe.25 He did not, however, provide an analysis of these processes or deal 
with the role of european and other international organizations.
The second category of existing literature comprises studies of Holocaust mem-
ory in various countries. This literature includes the volumes edited by Klas-göran 
Karlsson and Ulf Zander26 as well as Jean-Paul Himka and Joanna B. Michlic.27 
Contributions to Karlsson and Zander’s volumes analyzed various aspects of the 
Holocaust in the “historical cultures” of selected east european and Western coun-
tries, highlighting the underdevelopment of Holocaust memories in the east before 
1989 and their development thereafter. Contributors to Himka and Michlic’s volume 
ventured extensive overviews of “the reception of the Holocaust” in all post-commu-
nist countries of eastern europe. The volumes provide much material for compari-
son, but do not contain many comparisons themselves. although the introductory or 
concluding remarks to these volumes mentioned the role of international organiza-
tions such as the IHRa and the eU in forging Holocaust memory in eastern europe, 
this role was not analyzed.
The third category of literature consists of studies of the politics and policies of 
memory, particularly Holocaust memory, in the united europe that enlarged to the 
east. This category includes the works of emmanuel Droit,28 Maria Mälksoo,29 
Carlos Closa Montero,30 anne Wæhrens,31 and annabelle Littoz-Monnet.32 Droit 
took the broadest perspective, covering various east european countries and their 
different memories. Mälksoo dealt with Poland and the Baltic states. all but her 
highlighted the role of the eU, particularly the eP, in the construction of a european 
Holocaust memory. Wæhrens’s study was the most elaborate in this regard. Closa 
and Littoz-Monnet also analyzed the role of the eU’s Council of Ministers. although 
those authors dealt with the europeanization of Holocaust memory (without using 
this term), their focus was not on this process and its impact on eastern europe. They 
were all concerned primarily with what Droit called “the Holocaust and the gulag in 
opposition” and Closa considered “the object of a political conflict in the enlarged 
eU,”33 that is, the opposition or conflict between the memory of the destruction of 
Jews being central to West europeans and the memory of communist crimes being 
important for east europeans.
The fourth category of literature comprises such items as Carlos Closa Montero’s 
edited volume providing a comprehensive review of the national and international 
measures and practices of dealing with the memory of crimes committed by all totali-
tarian regimes in europe,34 and the OSCe’s specific overview of Holocaust Memorial 
Days in its member countries.35 These pieces provide extensive, almost exhaustive 
factual material, but by definition do not contain a discussion of it.
all in all, the existing literature offers numerous insights into what has been called 
here the europeanization of Holocaust memory, the role of the most important agents 
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in this process, and the developments of Holocaust memory in eastern europe. 
However, none of the pieces reviewed gives an exhaustive analysis of the process of 
the europeanization of Holocaust memory, its various agents, its outcome, and its 
impact upon eastern europe, and that is what this article will undertake.
Europeanizing Holocaust Memory: An Analysis of the Process
The europeanization of Holocaust memory was begun by the eP, which was also 
the major agent of that process. The eP adopted resolutions and declarations that, 
although not legally binding, have been the formal expressions and statements of the 
parliament’s opinions or intentions addressed to other eU institutions (notably the 
Council of Ministers and the european Commission), the governments and citizens 
of eU member states, and often also to the governments of non-member states and 
other european organizations. During five consecutive terms between 1989 and 
2014, the eP adopted a total of twelve documents—nine resolutions and three dec-
larations—that may be considered constitutive for the europeanization of Holocaust 
memory.36 additionally, the eP adopted numerous resolutions on combating racism, 
xenophobia and anti-Semitism that may be regarded as constituting a broader con-
text for the europeanization of Holocaust memory.
The document of the eP that may be considered the first step toward the 
europeanization of Holocaust memory was the “Resolution on european and inter-
national protection for Nazi concentration camps as historical monuments” of 11 
February 1993. Technically, the document did not contain the word “Holocaust” or 
“Jews,” and seemed to deal solely with the concentration camps, not the death camps 
where the Holocaust largely took place. It also took a broad perspective on the camp’s 
victims, calling for “informing visitors of the widely differing origins of the people 
imprisoned in these camps and the reasons for their deportation.” However, the docu-
ment referring to “the millions of people who died in Nazi concentration camps” 
indeed concerned all kinds of Nazi camps—the concentration camps proper, death 
camps, and others—and did concern the Holocaust and Jews. When the eP adopted 
this document, the eU comprised 12 Western european member states, four more 
were negotiating their entry, and the eU was soon to take a decision on its eastern 
enlargement. The eP addressed its resolution to other eU institutions and the mem-
ber state governments only. However, the document that referred to the millions of 
victims of the Nazi camps indeed concerned the former camps both within and out-
side of the then eU, that is, mostly in eastern europe, primarily in Poland. Thus, 
from its very outset, the europeanization of Holocaust memory was a process tran-
scending the then eU and reaching out to eastern europe.
The process gathered momentum between 1995 and 2000, when the eP adopted 
six more of its twelve Holocaust-related documents: (1) the “Resolution on a day to 
commemorate the Holocaust” of 15 June 1995, (2) the “Resolution on the return of 
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plundered property to Jewish communities” of 14 December 1995, (3) the “Resolution 
on auschwitz” of 18 april 1996, (4) the “Resolution on restitution of the possessions 
of Holocaust victims” of 16 July 1998, (5) the “Resolution on countering racism and 
xenophobia in the european Union” of 16 March 2000, and (6) the “Declaration on 
the remembrance of the Holocaust” of 7 June 2000. These documents made the 
Holocaust the central topic on the eP’s memory agenda.37
as the europeanization of Holocaust memory by the eP was gaining impetus 
between 1995 and 2000, the eU consisted of 15 member states, while ten of the 
countries of eastern europe—the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia—were candidates for 
eU membership. In that period, the eP addressed its documents not only to the eU 
institutions, member state governments, and citizens but also to other european 
nations, particularly the eU candidates from eastern europe, either indirectly—as 
members of other organizations called on in the documents—or directly. Thus, the 
europeanization of Holocaust memory was a process transcending the eU institu-
tionally and geographically to cover the whole continent, particularly eastern europe.
The eP’s document that had the widest array of direct and indirect addressees was 
the 1995 “Resolution on a day to commemorate the Holocaust.” The document called 
for “an annual european Day of Remembrance of the Holocaust to be instituted in all 
the Member States of the Union,” which defined the most specific aspect and the 
main objective of the europeanization of Holocaust memory. The eP reiterated and 
specified its call in its two documents of 2000. In the “Resolution on countering rac-
ism and xenophobia in the european Union,” it “encourage[d] the Member States 
and eU institutions to mark Shoah Day [on] 27 January (anniversary of the liberation 
of auschwitz, 1945).” In the “Declaration on the remembrance of the Holocaust,” the 
eP “call[ed] on the Council and the Commission to encourage appropriate forms of 
Holocaust remembrance, including an annual european Day of Holocaust 
Remembrance.” The 1995 “Resolution on a day to commemorate the Holocaust,” 
however, also included an appeal to “the member states of the Council of europe to 
back this initiative,” which gave the eP’s initiative a broader, trans-eU dimension. 
at that time, the Council of europe—an organization established in 1949 to promote 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and political liberty—comprised thirty-
four states, including all eU members, other West european states, and the ten east 
european countries that were then candidates for eU membership.
The eP’s document on the Holocaust that addressed directly the countries from 
eastern europe that had applied and would apply to join the eU was the 1995 
“Resolution on the return of plundered property to Jewish communities.” In the doc-
ument, the eP (1) “welcome[d] the fact that certain Central and eastern european 
states, notably Hungary and Romania, have accepted the principle of justice and 
morality by agreeing to return the property of Jewish communities to its rightful 
owners.” Moreover, it (2) “welcome[d] the fact that certain Central and eastern 
european countries have apologized publicly for the crimes committed against Jews 
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during the Second World War and have recognized their responsibilities in respect of 
these crimes.” The eP also (3) “call[ed] on all countries of Central and eastern 
europe which have not already done so to adopt appropriate legislation regarding the 
return of plundered property so that the property of Jewish communities may be 
returned to Jewish institutions, in accordance with the principles of justice and 
morality.”38 although the document referred explicitly to Hungary and Romania, 
which, like Croatia and Slovakia, had been east european allies of Nazi germany 
during (the most part of) the Second World War, its appeal was broader, to all “Central 
and east european states,” as the candidates from eastern europe were called by the 
eU. although the eP did not explicitly call on other east european countries to pub-
lically apologize for the Holocaust and to recognize their responsibilities for the 
crimes against the Jews, the parliament’s expectation in these regards was evident. 
No other eU document on the Holocaust included such direct and strong references 
to east european countries. Nor did any other eU document contain more explicit 
expectations regarding Holocaust apologies and recognition of responsibilities.
One eP Holocaust-related document—the 1996 “Resolution on auschwitz”—
was addressed to one east european country—Poland, on whose present-day terri-
tory this former Nazi german camp is located. The resolution was prompted by a 
“neo-Nazi demonstration,” that is, a march of Polish skinheads on the site of the 
former auschwitz camp. The march was a protest at the halting by the Polish authori-
ties of construction work on a supermarket and restaurant in the environs of the for-
mer camp—a development that met with protests from Jewish organizations.39 The 
eP “condemn[ed] strongly” this development as “the outrageous attempt to destroy 
the unique character of the concentration camps at auschwitz-Birkenau” and 
“deplore[d]” the march as “the renewed sign of racism, xenophobia and anti-Semi-
tism in Poland.” It also “condemn[ed] the attitude” of the Polish regional and local 
authorities that authorized the march. at the same time, the eP “approve[d] the con-
demnation” of the march and of the commercial development by the Polish president 
and government. It also “invite[d] the Polish authorities in conjunction with the 
[european] Commission to submit proposals for a centre for european cultural activ-
ities at auschwitz-Birkenau.” The “Resolution on auschwitz” was the most specific 
Holocaust-related document of the eP. at the same time, the document was full of 
general references, such as to the camp’s being a “lesson . . . for the whole of human-
ity,” combating of “racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism,” and cherishing “the 
memory of the millions of people murdered in concentration camps.” What made the 
resolution a Holocaust memory document, however, was the “historical fact that 
most of the victims of auschwitz were Jews.”
While the eP was europeanizing Holocaust memory within the eU and the pro-
cess was reaching out to eastern europe, in 1998 Sweden initiated the ITF/IHRa,40 
which in the following years became the major international organization promoting 
Holocaust education, remembrance, and research among its member countries and 
beyond. On 27–29 January 2000, the Swedish government staged the Stockholm 
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International Forum on the Holocaust—an event to propagate the goals of the ITF. 
The forum, attended by representatives of forty-six states, adopted a declaration41 
that became the mission statement of the ITF/IHRa. This Stockholm Declaration is, 
arguably, the most important document constructing and institutionalizing transna-
tional Holocaust memory and diffusing it, particularly in europe. It may therefore be 
regarded as a major contribution to the europeanization of Holocaust memory, add-
ing an intergovernmental dimension to what the eP—a supranational institution of 
the eU—was doing.
The ITF/IHRa, originally an informal initiative, took the form of an intergovern-
mental organization, consisting of senior representatives of governments and experts 
nominated by the governments. This has proven to be instrumental in diffusing 
Holocaust memory among the organization’s member and candidate countries and 
prompting incorporation of the memory within them. The ITF/IHRa’s membership 
has grown slowly but steadily, becoming both an indicator of and a factor in the 
europeanization of Holocaust memory. In 2014, the organization had thirty-one 
member countries, eleven of them from eastern europe—Poland since 1999; the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Lithuania since 2002; Latvia and Romania since 
2004; Croatia and Slovakia since 2005; estonia since 2007; Serbia and Slovenia 
since 2011.42 Four other east european countries declared their intentions to join the 
IHRa—Macedonia in 2009, Bulgaria in 2012, and albania and Moldova in 2014.43 
Thus, only seven countries of the region—albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Kosovo, Moldova, Montenegro, and Ukraine—have so far not been involved.
although the ITF/IHRa has been an organization involving several non-euro-
pean states, notably Israel and the USa, its activities focused on europe, particu-
larly on eastern europe, where the Holocaust largely took place. With mostly 
european countries among its members, sharing the goals of Holocaust memory 
with the eU, and acting mostly in europe, the ITF/IHRa became the major inter-
governmental partner of the supranational eP in its efforts to europeanize Holocaust 
memory. given the role the organization played in constructing and institutionaliz-
ing those goals and in diffusing and prompting their incorporation among its candi-
dates and members, it may then be regarded as an important agent reinforcing the 
europeanization of Holocaust memory, particularly in the east european member 
and candidate countries whose Holocaust memory had been underdeveloped as a 
result of communism.
In the early 2000s, as the ITF was developing its activities, the eP did not adopt 
any resolution or declaration regarding the Holocaust. at that time, however, three 
established international organizations—the Council of europe, the OSCe, and the 
UN—became involved in promoting Holocaust memory, thus reinforcing its 
europeanization. The Council of europe and the governments of its member states 
backed the eP’s initiative of a Holocaust Remembrance Day. On 18 October 2002, 
the ministers of education of all then 44 member countries of the Council, including 
nearly all east european states,44 adopted a declaration to the institution by each 
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country of an annual “Day of Remembrance of the Holocaust and for the Prevention 
of Crimes against Humanity” to be observed in schools.45 In 2004, the representa-
tives of all 57 participating states of the OSCe from europe, North america, and 
asia, including all east european countries considered in this article (except for 
Kosovo), committed themselves to “promote remembrance of and, as appropriate, 
education about the tragedy of the Holocaust” in the context of combating anti-Sem-
itism, xenophobia, and racism and promoting tolerance, nondiscrimination, mutual 
respect, and understanding.46 The ODIHR of the OSCe has been instrumental in 
sharing good practices in Holocaust remembrance and education. It has also pro-
vided an overview of governmental practices. In 2005 the UN general assembly 
adopted a resolution committing the organization’s member states across the globe to 
designate 27 January—the day auschwitz was liberated in 1945—as “an annual 
International Day of Commemoration in memory of the victims of the Holocaust.”47
In 2005 came the height of international interest in the Holocaust and of the 
europeanization of its memory by the eP. On 27 January, while a record number of 
heads of state and government from europe and the wider world gathered at the site 
of the former auschwitz-Birkenau camp for commemorations, the eP adopted its 
most important “Resolution on remembrance of the Holocaust, anti-semitism and 
racism.” The resolution, which combined the eP’s concern with the Holocaust and 
combating anti-Semitism and racism, reiterated the call to “encourage[e] Holocaust 
remembrance, including making 27 January “european Holocaust Memorial Day 
across the whole of the eU” and to “reinforce Holocaust education.” The call, like 
the whole document, was addressed to the Council of the eU, the european 
Commission, and the governments of member and candidate states. Throughout 
2005, the term “Holocaust” was used the most frequently in all the eP’s documents 
produced so far.48 at that time, the eU comprised twenty-five member states, follow-
ing the accession of eight east european countries—the Czech Republic, estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia—and two Mediterranean 
countries—Cyprus and Malta—on 1 May 2004. The 2005 resolution and other eP 
documents also applied to Bulgaria and Romania, which joined the eU on 1 January 
2007; Croatia, which acceded on 1 July 2013; and the remaining east european 
countries that had applied and would apply to become Member States of the eU.
Since 2005, the Holocaust has ceased to be the main memory topic of interest of 
the eP. The main reason for this change was, arguably, that the europeanization of 
Holocaust memory reached its culmination. The change, however, coincided with 
and was partly caused by the eastern enlargement of the eU in 2004 and 2007, 
which extended the eP’s memory agenda including the fate of eastern europe under 
communism. The 2005 resolution was the last major eP memory document in which 
the Holocaust was the central notion. The following “Resolution on the 60th anni-
versary of the end of the Second World War in europe on 8 May 1945” was the 
first eP memory document where the Holocaust victims were not referred to by 
themselves or first but in the context of “all the victims of Nazi tyranny.” This 
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comprehensive document, also dealing with manifold developments after the war, 
included references to the negative consequences of the war for eastern europe, 
mainly “decades under Soviet domination or occupation or other communist dicta-
torships,” and recent positive developments, including “the democratic revolutions 
in which they overthrew the communist regimes and liberated themselves.” The 
following two documents—the “Declaration on the proclamation of 23 august as 
european day of remembrance for victims of Stalinism and Nazism” adopted on 23 
September 2008 and the “Resolution on european conscience and totalitarianism” 
adopted on 2 april 2009—placed the Holocaust and the Nazi crimes in general 
besides the communist, particularly Stalinist crimes. The adoption of these docu-
ments occurred amidst political struggles in the eP for what may be called the rec-
ognition of the eastern european past that was mostly unknown or forgotten in 
Western europe. although this process can best be analyzed in terms of mnemonic 
and/or political conflict and, indeed, was analyzed in this way,49 the product of the 
process—the new european memory contained in the eP’s documents that encom-
passes the Holocaust, other Nazi crimes, the communist crimes, and other negative 
as well as positive developments of the twentieth century—may be interpreted as 
inclusive and complementary. The last Holocaust-related document—the 
“Declaration of the european Parliament of 10 May 2012 on support for the estab-
lishment of a european Day of Remembrance for the Righteous”—included the 
rescuers in the scope of europeanizing Holocaust memory. The inclusive and recon-
ciliatory tenet of european memory will be manifested in the House of european 
History—a cultural institution and exhibition center initiated by the european 
Parliament in 2007 and planned to open in Brussels in 2016.50
Europeanized Holocaust Memory: An Analysis of the Outcome
The europeanization of Holocaust memory by the transnational agents—the eP, 
the ITF/IHRa, the Council of europe, the OSCe, and the UN—resulted in the defi-
nition and consolidation of the following key beliefs regarding the Holocaust. (1) 
The Holocaust (Shoah) was (essentially) the persecution and annihilation of 
european Jews by Nazi germany, its allies, and collaborators. (2) The Holocaust has 
had a universal meaning for all humanity because it fundamentally challenged the 
foundations of civilization. (3) The Holocaust has to be remembered in order to 
prevent genocide and ethnic cleansing; to combat anti-Semitism, racism, and xeno-
phobia; and to promote tolerance, nondiscrimination, mutual respect, and under-
standing. The process also produced the following key norms and rules for states 
regarding the Holocaust. (1) Remember, educate about, and research the Holocaust, 
in particular: (a) institute a Holocaust Remembrance Day for public commemora-
tions and educational activities and (b) join the IFT/IHRa. (2) Preserve and com-
memorate Holocaust sites—former camps, deportation sites, execution sites, and 
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ghettos. (3) Restitute the property of Holocaust victims to its owners or their heirs. 
(4) Recognize your country’s and/or your fellow-nationals’ responsibility for the 
Holocaust crimes and apologize publicly for these crimes. These beliefs, norms, and 
rules constituted a european Holocaust memory, impacting national (and sub-
national) Holocaust memories. Four aspects of this europeanized Holocaust mem-
ory and its impact upon eastern europe are worthy of closer examination.
First, in dealing with the Holocaust, all the analyzed organizations focused on its 
Jewish victims. However, while some dealt with the Jews alone, others also included 
other victim groups of Nazi germany in the Holocaust concept. Thus, the eP (as 
well as other institutions of the eU) has consistently understood the Holocaust as 
Jewish only, occasionally using the Hebrew word “Shoah.” Other victim groups of 
Nazi germany—Roma, Slavic peoples such as Poles and Russians, people of other 
nationalities, and homosexuals and the handicapped—were not included in the eU’s 
concept of the Holocaust, although these groups and the atrocities committed upon 
them were referred to in the eP’s documents on the Holocaust, notably in the two 
resolutions of 2005. The OSCe took a similar stance. although the organization’s 
decision of 2004 to promote Holocaust remembrance and education did not specify 
who the victims of the Holocaust had been, the decision’s title, “Combating anti-
Semitism,” implied that they had been Jews. The educational materials produced by 
the OSCe ODIHR (in cooperation with Yad Vashem) were more elaborate, quoting 
the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum’s definition of the Holocaust, which 
specifies its victims as “six million Jews” and adds: “During the Holocaust, the Nazis 
also targeted other groups because of their perceived ‘racial inferiority’: Roma/Sinti 
(gypsies), the handicapped, and some of the Slavic peoples (Poles, Russians, and oth-
ers). Other groups were persecuted on political and behavioral grounds, among them 
Communists, Socialists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and homosexuals.”51 The Council of 
europe and the UN adopted broader notions of the Holocaust. For the UN, the 
Holocaust meant “the murder of one third of the Jewish people, along with count-
less members of other minorities,” as the general assembly stated in its 2005 reso-
lution. The “other minorities” were specified as “gypsies, mentally and physically 
disabled people, and homosexual men.”52 The Council of europe took the broadest 
approach, specifying in its resolution on a Holocaust Remembrance Day that “all 
victims are taken into consideration—Jews, Roma, Resistance members, politi-
cians, homosexuals, Jehovah’s Witnesses, disabled persons.” The educational mate-
rials sponsored by the Council also included civilians of various nationalities and 
prisoners of war among the Holocaust victims.53 The ITF/IHRa has developed a 
different stance still. It began and has continued with the concept of the Holocaust 
as Jewish only. It dealt solely with this topic until 2007, when it expanded its the-
matic mandate to include the genocide of Roma and other topics, such as genocide 
prevention and combating anti-Semitism. These varied approaches of the interna-
tional agents of Holocaust memory supported a variety of concepts of the Holocaust 
in eastern europe. For example, in Poland, the word “Holocaust” (spelt with a 
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capital “H”) has referred only to Jews, as has the Polish word “Zagłada.” These 
words, spelt with lower-case letters, however, can refer to the Jewish and non-Jew-
ish victims of the Second World War. In Hungary, “Holocaust” has concerned Jews, 
and the genocide of Roma has been recognized on its own. In Slovakia, the word 
“Holocaust” has referred to both Jews and Roma. In Ukraine, “Holocaust” is often 
used in reference to all victims of the Nazi german occupation—Ukrainians and 
other non-Jews, along with Jews.
Second, european Holocaust memory, while centered on Jews as victims, has also 
been concerned with perpetrators. In the eP documents and elsewhere, the perpetra-
tors were referred to as the Nazis or Nazi germany. Yet the europeanizing memory 
of the Holocaust also included east european perpetrators of and accomplices in the 
Holocaust. This was evident in the 1995 “Resolution on the return of plundered prop-
erty to Jewish communities,” welcoming public apologies for involvement in the 
Holocaust and recognition of responsibilities for it by certain (unnamed) countries of 
eastern europe. Strikingly, in no eU document on the Holocaust has there been a 
reference to West european perpetrators other than Nazi germany or to West 
european accomplices. Nor has there been an encouragement to West european 
nations (other than germany) to apologize for the crimes against Jews and to recog-
nize responsibility for those crimes. The 1995 resolution also implicitly referred to 
those who gained from the Holocaust. This was also the case in the 1998 “Resolution 
on the restitution of the possessions of Holocaust victims.” as for other agents 
involved in the Holocaust, european Holocaust memory included the rescuers of 
Jews only at the latest stage—in the 2012 declaration supporting the establishment of 
a “european Day of Remembrance for the Righteous.” Remarkably, in no analyzed 
Holocaust memory document produced by the eP or the international organizations 
concerned has there been a reference to onlookers or bystanders and to the passivity 
of governments vis-à-vis the Holocaust, while lessons from their attitudes also need 
to be learnt.
as in Western europe, in eastern europe too developing Holocaust memory has 
centered on Jews as victims, and it has also been concerned with the perpetrators. 
However, most east europeans have been keener than West europeans to refer to the 
perpetrators as “germans” rather than “Nazis.” The cause of this is primarily the way 
in which east europeans referred to the invaders of some of their nations or allies of 
others during the Second World War, and what they continue to call them.54 It is also 
caused by the prevalence of ethnic categorizations rather than political ones in the 
region,55 and by the reluctance of most east europeans to deal with the complicity in 
or perpetration of the Holocaust by many of their predecessors and/or the predeces-
sors of some contemporary east european states.56 However, the encouragements of 
the eP to apologize and take responsibility for the Holocaust and, more importantly, 
the ITF/IHRa requirement for candidate states to examine their past in relation to the 
Holocaust,57 contributed to developments in these regards. Notable examples 
included investigations into the Holocaust crimes committed by Poles in Jedwabne 
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and by Romania, resulting in the publication of reports and acts of public regret by 
the Polish and Romanian presidents in 2001 and 2004, respectively.58 However, deal-
ing with the past during the Holocaust did not take place in all east european coun-
tries. Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine are among the countries where the least has 
been done.59 Where dealing with this past was undertaken, the process was not uni-
versal or its effects were not profound enough. Thus, there was no wider public 
debate on the Holocaust in Romania. In Poland, where there was an extensive public 
debate on the Jedwabne massacre, many believe that the crime was perpetrated by 
germans rather than Poles.60
Third, the main facet of european Holocaust memory has been remembrance, and 
the main objective of the europeanization of Holocaust memory was the instituting 
of “an annual european Day of Remembrance of the Holocaust,” as the eP put it in 
its 1995 “Resolution on a day to commemorate the Holocaust.” In the resolutions 
adopted in 2000 and 2005, the eP designated 27 January—the day auschwitz was 
liberated in 1945. Moreover, as indicated in the 2000 resolution, the eP meant the 
day to commemorate the Jews only. as decision making on remembrance was not 
(and still is not) a competence of the eU institutions, but rather one of the member 
states’ of the Union, the eP could only call on the national authorities to take appro-
priate decisions. The backing of the eP initiative by the Council of europe and the 
UN, the activities of the ITF, and, most importantly, the decisions taken at a national 
level, resulted in the development of Holocaust remembrance and instituting of 
Holocaust remembrance days across europe, Western and eastern.61 The eP, how-
ever, failed to reach its objective of instituting one annual european Holocaust 
Remembrance Day commemorating Jews only in all member states of the Union on 
the same day of 27 January. No european country has instituted a specifically 
european Holocaust Remembrance Day. Legislated by the national authorities, the 
Remembrance Days in all countries have had a national character, which is often 
reflected in the day’s formal names. Some countries, however, refer to the 
Remembrance Days instituted by the international organizations—the Council of 
europe and the UN.62 27 January was legislated by twelve of fifteen West european 
member states of the eU—germany in 1996, followed by Sweden (1999), Italy 
(2000), Finland and the United Kingdom (2001), Denmark (2002), Ireland (2003), 
Belgium and Spain (2004), greece (2005), Luxembourg (2009), and Portugal (2010). 
Three West european eU member states legislated different days that reflect their 
respective historical experience. The Netherlands has since 1946 observed 4 May, 
the eve of the country’s liberation in 1945, as Remembrance Day. France, which in 
1993 became the first country to institute a specific Holocaust Remembrance Day, 
chose the Sunday closest to 16 July, the day in 1942 when the first round-up of Jews 
took place in Paris. austria has observed 5 May, the day on which the Mauthausen 
camp was liberated in 1945, since 1997. In nearly all West european eU member 
states, the Holocaust Remembrance Days commemorate Jews and other victims of the 
Holocaust era. In some countries, they also concern victims of other wars and genocides. 
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Only in greece and France do the Holocaust Remembrance Days commemorate 
Jews alone.
In eastern europe, diversity in Holocaust Remembrance Days is much greater 
than in Western europe, and more countries commemorate only Jews on those days. 
27 January was legislated in four of eleven east european member states of the 
eU—estonia (2002), Croatia (2003), the Czech Republic (2004), and Slovenia 
(2008)—and in two other countries—albania (2004) and Ukraine (2011). Five east 
european eU member states chose different days reflecting respective significant 
events related to the Holocaust in those countries. Latvia chose 4 July, the day in 
1941 when Jews were burnt alive in a synagogue in Riga, and has celebrated this day 
since 1990. In 1994, Lithuania instituted 23 September, marking the liquidation of 
the ghetto of Vilnius in 1943. In 2000, Hungary legislated 16 april, the day in 1944 
of the establishment of the first ghetto in wartime Hungary (in Munkács [Мукачеве] 
in present-day Ukraine), and the start of the deportation of Hungarian Jewry. Since 
2002, Bulgaria has observed 10 March, the day in 1943 when the government and the 
public of the country prevented the deportations of its Jews. In 2004, Romania insti-
tuted 9 October, marking the beginning of deportations of Jews to Transnistria by the 
Romanian authorities in 1941. In 2011 (the Former Yugoslav Republic of) Macedonia, 
a eU candidate, legislated 11 March, the day in 1943 when the country’s Jews were 
deported to the death camp of Treblinka. Two other east european member states of 
the eU—Poland and Slovakia—and one eU candidate—Serbia—observe both 27 
January and a day of national Holocaust significance. Poland has commemorated 27 
January and 19 april, the day in 1943 when the Warsaw ghetto Uprising broke out, 
since 1946. These days were legislated as official Holocaust Remembrance Days in 
2004 and 2005, respectively, following the Council of europe’s and the UN’s deci-
sions. Since 2000 Slovakia has celebrated 9 September, the day in 1941 when the 
anti-Jewish laws were adopted by the wartime government. Since 1992, Serbia has 
observed 22 april, the day in 1945 when a group of inmates attempted to break out 
of the Ustaše-operated Jasenovac concentration camp in Croatia. In 2006 it legislated 
27 January. Two countries of eastern europe—Belarus and Bosnia and Herzegovina—
report that they do not have an official Holocaust Remembrance Day, although they 
observe 27 January as International Day of Commemoration in Memory of the 
Victims of the Holocaust. Three other countries—Kosovo, Moldova, and 
Montenegro—had not instituted a Holocaust Remembrance Day by 2014. among 
the 17 countries of eastern europe analyzed in this article for which data are avail-
able, six—Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Romania—com-
memorate only Jews on their Holocaust Remembrance Days, while others pay 
homage to Jewish and non-Jewish victims of the Holocaust era.
Fourth, although the eP began europeanizing Holocaust memory with a concern 
with the concentration and death camps, it has not dealt with these and other physical 
sites of the Holocaust since the adoption of the 1993 resolution and the 1996 resolu-
tion on auschwitz. Surprisingly, the eP has not concerned itself at all with the 
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Holocaust memorials and museums, except when referring to the educational func-
tion of the museum at auschwitz. The physical sites, memorials, and museums of the 
Holocaust also remained beyond the scope of the Holocaust memory activities and 
documents of the Council of europe, the OSCe, and the UN. The sites of the 
Holocaust and its memorials and museums, however, have been at the top of the 
agenda of the ITF/IHRa since its inception and the Stockholm Declaration. Since 
2002, the ITF/IHRa has operated its Memorials and Museums Working group to 
mobilize support and expertise for Holocaust memorialization. This activity has 
proven instrumental for many Holocaust memorialization projects carried out in 
eastern europe by various agents—governmental (of various levels and kinds) and 
non-governmental, domestic and international, between the late 1990s and early 
2010s. Thus, the national authorities of Poland reinforced legal protection of the sites 
of the former Nazi german concentration and death camps. Holocaust memorials 
were erected in Bratislava, Budapest, Bucharest, and dozens of other locations. 
Memorial plaques were placed at numerous sites of deportation, ghettoes, and execu-
tions. The existing state museums of former camps or ghettoes, such as those at 
auschwitz, Majdanek, and Terezín (Theresienstadt), had new Holocaust exhibits 
added or old ones developed. at the auschwitz museum, the new Czech, Hungarian, 
and Slovak national exhibitions on the Holocaust were opened (as were the new 
Holocaust exhibitions of Belgium, France, Israel, and the Netherlands). New state-
sponsored Holocaust memorial museums or Holocaust exhibits were established in 
Budapest, Riga, Skopje, and other cities. existing Jewish museums, such as those in 
Bratislava, Bucharest, Prague, and Riga, developed Holocaust sections. New Jewish 
museums, such as those in Kraków and Warsaw, were established. Thus, eastern 
europe—the area where the Holocaust had largely taken place—became marked by 
tangible products of Holocaust memory.
Conclusions
The europeanization of Holocaust memory—the process of construction, institu-
tionalization, and diffusion of beliefs regarding the Holocaust as well as formal and 
informal norms and rules regarding Holocaust remembrance and education first 
defined and consolidated at a european level and then incorporated in the practices 
of european countries—was induced by multiple agents acting at various levels. The 
agents identified and discussed in this article played various roles in the process. at 
a transnational, european level, the eP, which began and championed the process, 
primarily constructed the norms and rules of Holocaust remembrance. These norms 
and rules concerned mainly a Holocaust Remembrance Day and protection of the 
former Nazi camps. Holocaust education was of lesser concern for the eP. The eP 
also diffused the norms and rules that it constructed within and beyond the enlarging 
eU. However, it did not play a major role in the institutionalization of Holocaust 
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memory. The norms and rules that it constructed through resolutions and declara-
tions were not formal “hard law,” but informal “soft law.” The ITF/IHRa, which 
became the international organization dealing with Holocaust memory, an organiza-
tion comprising mostly european states, contributed to the europeanization of that 
memory. The ITF/IHRa’s role in the process was mainly the diffusion and prompt-
ing of incorporation of beliefs and norms regarding primarily Holocaust education 
and also Holocaust remembrance, including Holocaust memorialization. The Council 
of europe, which contributed to the europeanization of Holocaust memory through 
the declaration of the ministers of education of its member states on a Holocaust 
Remembrance Day, played a different role. It institutionalized, diffused, and 
prompted incorporation of the main remembrance rule of Holocaust memory in 
education. Similarly, the OSCe and the UN further institutionalized and contributed 
to the incorporation of the rule of Holocaust Remembrance Day. However, their 
focus was not on education, but on acts of remembrance. at a country level, govern-
ments were naturally the key agents—although not the only ones—of the incorpora-
tion of Holocaust memory consolidated by the nationally elected members of the eP 
and the representatives of the national governments in the international organiza-
tions. Other agents that incorporated transnational Holocaust memory and devel-
oped Holocaust memory within states that were not discussed in this article but 
whose role needs to be acknowledged included domestic and foreign governmental 
agencies, nongovernmental and religious organizations, corporations, and private 
individuals.
The transnational agents and the process discussed in this article made a varied 
but significant contribution to the development of Holocaust memory in the coun-
tries of eastern europe. Based upon the evidence provided, one may distinguish four 
tiers of east european countries according to the length and strength of impact and 
the amount of development of Holocaust memory. The first tier comprises ten coun-
tries—Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. They acceded to the eU in 2004 or 2007, having 
been in accession negotiations since 1998 or 2000, candidates for eU entry since the 
mid-1990s, and in association with the eU since the early 1990s. Nine of them 
belong to the IHRa; the tenth—Bulgaria—is a candidate. Croatia, which joined the 
ITF/IHRa in 2005 and entered the eU in 2013, may be regarded as the eleventh 
member of this tier. The national memories of the Holocaust in the first-tier countries 
are the most developed in the region, although there are some disparities among 
them. The second tier consists of two candidates for eU entry from the “Western 
Balkans”—(the Former Yugoslav Republic of) Macedonia and Serbia. Serbia is an 
IHRa member, and Macedonia is a candidate. Both countries have considerably 
developed their Holocaust memories. The third tier is the actual or potential eU can-
didates from the “Western Balkans” that are not IHRa members or candidates, with 
relatively little Holocaust history and barely developed Holocaust memory—
albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. The fourth tier is made up of the 
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three former Soviet republics—Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine—which are neither 
eU nor IHRa candidates. These countries have a long way ahead to develop their 
national memories of the Holocaust—an event much involved in their histories.
There were several differences between the europeanization of Holocaust mem-
ory in the West and the east. We can identify four that seem to be the most important. 
The first concerned the timing. The process had begun in Western europe before it 
reached eastern europe. The second concerned the differences in the relationship 
between european and national Holocaust memory as well as between european and 
national identity. In the West, the europeanization of Holocaust memory, being part 
of the construction of european identity that added to national identities, followed 
the development of national Holocaust memories. In the east, europeanization 
prompted the development of scant national Holocaust memories. These memories 
unfolded alongside and often in competition with the memories of national suffering 
and losses inflicted by Nazism and, particularly, communism, thus contributing to 
the development of national identities. The third difference referred to the relation-
ship between Holocaust memory and gulag memory, that is, the memory of the com-
munist crimes. When Holocaust memory was developing in eastern europe, it did 
not only often stand in opposition to but also frequently became less important than 
gulag memory. This was not the case in Western europe, where Holocaust memory 
had become a cornerstone of european memory and identity before the memory of 
the communist crimes in eastern europe became an issue. Fourth, after Holocaust 
memory had grown in eastern europe, it became more diverse and more national—
that is, concerning primarily various Holocaust events of national importance—than 
Holocaust memory in the West, which was by and large more homogenous and trans-
national, meaning primarily concerned with the Holocaust as the ultimate breach of 
human rights. How can these differences in the europeanization of Holocaust mem-
ory in the east and the West be explained?
It seems that the most important cause of all the above differences lies in the dif-
ferent historical experiences of the two parts of europe. Three facts are essential in 
this regard. Firstly, the Holocaust took place largely in eastern europe and com-
prised the destruction of mostly east european Jews. These aspects of the “east-
europeanness” of the Holocaust are the main explanation of why Holocaust memory 
in eastern europe is apparently more diverse and national than seemingly more 
homogenous and transnational Holocaust memory in the West. Secondly, commu-
nism, the ruling system in eastern europe from the late 1940s until 1989–1991, was 
repressing the development of national Holocaust memories in the region while 
democracy was enabling the development of national and transnational Holocaust 
memory in the West. This is the major reason why eastern europe generally lagged 
behind the West in the development of national Holocaust memories and in the 
europeanization of Holocaust memory, and why europeanization resulted in the 
growth of national Holocaust memories in the east. Thirdly, the amount of human 
suffering and the scale of human losses of (non-Jewish) east europeans during the 
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Second World War (as well as before and after) were felt by many people in the 
region to be much larger than was the case for West europeans, and also for the Jews. 
This explains why national memories in eastern europe centered on the nations’ own 
suffering and losses rather than on the Holocaust. Some kinds of this suffering and 
these losses, particularly at the hands of the Soviets and indigenous communists, 
were not experienced in the West. The Soviet and other communist crimes (as well 
as some other wartime sufferings and losses) could not be dealt with by east 
europeans during communism. These two factors explain why gulag memory (and 
the memories of some other sufferings and losses) competed with Holocaust memory 
both within (some) east european countries and in the european forums.
The Holocaust is an event that is becoming increasingly distant in time. Despite this 
fact, its memory has developed immensely in europe, particularly in eastern europe, 
over the past two decades. Has this development reached its limits? It appears to have 
as far as the memory’s intensity is concerned. Whatever else might be established 
alongside the existing Holocaust Remembrance Days, Holocaust education, and 
Holocaust memorials and museums? It seems, however, that one could organize more 
moving commemorations and design better educational programs and exhibits. It is 
also necessary to develop Holocaust memory in the aspects that are underdeveloped 
nationally and transnationally, especially in respect of coming to terms with the 
Holocaust past for the sake of the present and the future. Will the european memory of 
the Holocaust last? The dense network of transnational organizations that sustain the 
national memories of the Holocaust that constitute european Holocaust memory and 
highly institutionalized national Holocaust memories allow one to predict that it will.
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